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T oday,	 there	 are	 still	 some	discussions	on	the	definition	of	explosive	remnants	of	war,	but	it	is	generally	understood	
that	the	problems	ERW	cause	are	both	wide-
spread	 and	 long-term,	 and	 that	 the	 number	
of	casualties	and	deaths	caused	by	both	unex-
ploded	and	abandoned	grenades,	mortar	shells,	
fuzes	and	cluster	bombs	is	high	and	equivalent	
to	 landmines.	The	 physical	 and	 psychologi-
cal	 impacts	 of	 ERW	 on	 a	 community	 are	
significant	considering	the	number	of	deaths	
and	 nature	 of	 injuries	 caused,	 which	 can	
overload	often	stretched	medical	infrastruc-
tures.	ERW	also	have	a	wider	socioeconomic	
impact	 on	 affected	 communities	 in	 terms	
of	land	use	and	blockages	to	reconstruction	
and	development	activities.	
The	 main	 points	 related	 to	 the	 threats	
caused	by	ERW	are:
•	 Injuries	or	deaths	can	take	place	at	a	dis-
tance	from	the	explosion.
•	 Items	of	unexploded	ordnance	are	gen-
erally	 more	 powerful	 (and	 therefore	
more	lethal)	than	anti-personnel	mines.
•	 When	UXO	 accidents	 do	 not	 involve	 deaths,	 they	 typically	
result	in	severe	wounds.
•	 ERW	are	generally	found	on	the	surface	and	are	therefore	more	
visible,	which	can	result	in	more	interaction	with	ERW	than	
mines.	Also,	UXO	can	be	located	subsurface	where	clearance	
can	be	particularly	difficult.
•	 The	fear	of	UXO	is	generally	lower	than	the	fear	of	mines	be-
cause	UXO	can	be	more	visible	and	this	gives	people	a	false	
impression	of	safety,	which	can	be	very	dangerous.
•	 ERW	are	unpredictable	and	can	detonate	at	anytime	due	to	a	
variety	of	stimuli.
by	Nazim	Ismaylov	and	Emil	Hasanov	[	Azerbaijan	National	Agency	for	Mine	Action	]
This article explains the danger of explosive remnants of war1 when located 
within communities and the precautions that need to be taken in order to 
get rid of this problem. It also describes how the Azerbaijan National Agency 
for Mine Action is trying to address the problem of abandoned ammunition 
storage in one of the most highly contaminated areas among existing 
abandoned ammunition storages in the world.
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Azerbaijan	 has	 not	 signed	 the	 Convention	 on	 Certain	
Conventional	Weapons2	or	the	Ottawa	Convention3	for	several	rea-
sons	 including	 some	 political	 issues	 with	 neighbouring	 countries,	
particularly	 the	 conditions	 of	 the	war	with	Armenia.	Armenia	 oc-
cupies	 the	 territory	 of	 Nagorny-Karabakh	 and	 seven	 surrounding	
regions,	totaling	20	percent	of	Azerbaijan.	Today	there	are	just	un-
der	eight	million	people	in	Azerbaijan.	Of	these,	650,000	are	inter-
nally	displaced	persons	and	300,000	are	ethnic	Azeris	who	came	to	
Azerbaijan	from	Armenia.
Despite	the	fact	that	Azerbaijan	has	not	
signed	the	Ottawa	Convention,	the	country	
is	supportive	of	it	according	to	“Azerbaijan	
and	 the	Ottawa	 Process.”4	 This	 document	
states,	 “The	government	of	Azerbaijan	has	
supported	from	the	outset	the	idea	of	having	
a	 comprehensive	 international	 legal	 docu-
ment	on	prohibition	of	use,	stockpiling,	pro-
duction	and	transfer	of	anti-personnel	mines.	
Our	 country	 has	 learnt	 the	 catastrophe	
that	this	ammunition	can	bring.	Therefore	
Azerbaijan	advocates	demining	and	destruc-
tion	of	mines.	Azerbaijan	shares	all	concerns	
taken	 into	 consideration	 while	 coming	 to	
the	 statement	of	 the	Convention	and	 is	 in-
volved	 neither	 in	 transfer,	 transportation,	
nor	 in	 production	 of	 anti-personnel	 mines.	
But	 continued	 conflict	 prevents	Azerbaijan	
from	acceding	to	the	Document.”	The	gov-
ernment	 of	 Azerbaijan	 hopes	 to	 sign	 the	
Ottawa	Convention	once	the	conflicts	in	its	
territories	are	resolved.	
UXO Operations and Abandoned 
Ammunition Storage Clearance 
History of the problem. A	military	am-
munition	warehouse	located	in	Agstafa,	con-
sisting	of	138	bunkers,	was	the	largest	Soviet	
warehouse	in	the	south	Caucasus.	Agstafa	is	
located	in	the	northwest	part	of	Azerbaijan,	
bordering	 the	 Kazakh	 region	 in	 the	 west,	
Tovuz	 in	 the	east,	 the	Republic	of	Georgia	
in	the	north	and	Armenia	in	the	south.	
In	 1991,	 when	 Azerbaijan	 regained	 in-
dependence,	 the	 warehouse	 was	 destroyed	
by	the	Soviet	Army	before	it	departed.	As	a	
result	of	 the	explosion,	 thousands	of	pieces	
of	UXO	were	 scattered	 over	 44	 square	 ki-
lometres	 (17	 square	 miles),	 posing	 serious	
humanitarian,	 socioeconomic	 and	 environ-
mental	threats	to	the	local	population.	
Since	 the	 explosion,	 148	 UXO-related	
accidents	have	been	reported,	with	31	peo-
ple	 dead	 and	 80	 injured.	 To	 collect	 scrap	
metal	 from	 the	UXO,	 people	 are	 exposing	
themselves	to	injury	and	death.	Some	compa-
nies	trying	to	gain	profit	have	been	involved	
in	illegally	collecting	UXO	from	surround-
ing	areas,	devising	simple	methods	involving	
Operational	map	of	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan.	Green	denotes	the	occupied	area	
of	Nagorny-Karabakh	and	seven	surrounding	areas.
ALL	GRAPHICS	AND	PHOTOS	COURTESY	OF	ANAMA
very	unsafe	techniques.	By	selling	the	metal	
and	 non-ferrous	 parts	 of	 the	 projectiles,	
both	 individuals	 and	 companies	 supple-
ment	 their	 income.	 This	 is	 the	 principal	
cause	 of	 many	 deaths	 and	 injuries	 among	
the	 people	 living	near	 Saloglu,	 a	 village	 in	
Agstafa.	 A	 recent	 accident	 involved	 the	
death	of	a	young	man	searching	among	the	
unexploded	bombs	for	copper	to	sell	at	the	
local	market.
Azerbaijan	 appealed	 to	 NATO	 for	 as-
sistance	in	the	clearance	of	the	Saloglu	area	
and	the	destruction	of	stockpiled	UXO.	As	
an	initial	step,	the	NATO	Maintenance	and	
Supply	 Agency	 conducted	 a	 technical	 as-
sessment	 of	 the	 site	 and	 consequently	 the	
Partnership	 for	 Peace	 Trust	 Fund	 on	 the	
Saloglu	Project	was	established.	The	role	of	
the	 lead	 nation	 in	 the	 Saloglu	 Project	 was	
given	to	Turkey.
On	14	February	2005	all	efforts	aimed	at	
facilitating	the	Saloglu	Project	in	Azerbaijan	
were	 brought	 together	 at	 the	NATO	head-
quarters	in	Brussels,	Belgium.	Turkey	signed	
the	 Financial	 Management	 Agreement	 for	
the	 project	 at	 a	 special	 ceremony	 involving	
NATO	 Secretary-General	 Jaap	 de	 Hoop	
Scheffer	and	the	representatives	of	contribut-
ing	countries.
The	 total	 cost	 of	 the	 project	 is	 valued	
at	€1,047,649	 (approximately	US$1.3	mil-
lion)	and	is	estimated	it	will	last	16	months.	
Azerbaijan,	 as	 a	 host	 nation,	 met	 all	 the	
commitments	 on	 the	 project.	With	 contri-
butions	 from	 NATO	 and	 individual	 part-
ner	 nations—namely	 Australia,	 Finland,	
Luxembourg,	Norway,	Switzerland,	Turkey	
UXO	operators’	rapid	reaction	to	a	violent	explosion	at	an	illegal	workshop	set	up	by	locals	approximately	200	metres	
(219	yards)	from	residential	area	in	Agstafa	town	(October	21,	2005).
Abandoned	ammunitions	in	Saloglu	village	and	surrounding	areas	(Agstafa	region)—presently	an	operational	site	
for	clearance.
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and	the	United	States—as	well	as	the	United	
Nations	 Development	 Programme,	 the	
required	 funding	 for	 the	 project	 has	 been	
raised.	The	Azerbaijan	National	Agency	or	
Mine	 Action	 UXO	 team,	 with	 a	 capacity	
of	 11	 UXO	 operators,	 launched	 the	 proj-
ect	 13	December	 2005.	 ANAMA	 instruc-
tors	 joined	 with	 United	 States	 European	
Command	 (USEUCOM)	 specialists	 to	
train	 an	 additional	 36	UXO	 operators	 for	
the	 same	 project	 at	 ANAMA’s	 Regional	
Office	 in	 Khanlar	 (UXO	 team	 capacity	
within	ANAMA	was	created	with	the	sup-
port	of	USEUCOM	in	2002).
Abandoned ammunition storage clear-
ance. In	 describing	 the	 problem	 of	 ERW,	
the	threat	of	abandoned	ammunition	is	also	
significant.	When	 researching	 information	
on	 the	 subject	 of	 abandoned	 ammunition,	
cases	can	be	found	in	Nigeria,	Albania	and	
Kuwait,	 but	 thus	 far	minimal	 information	
describing	 Azerbaijan’s	 abandoned	 ammu-
nition	problem	is	available.	The	Soviet	ware-
house	in	Agstafa	can	provide	an	additional	
case	 for	better	understanding	 the	 threat	of	
abandoned	ammunition	and	the	challenges	
that	 groups	 like	ANAMA	 face	 in	 order	 to	
clear	this	type	of	ERW.
The	task	for	abandoned	Soviet	munition	
storage	clearance	in	Agstafa	is	very	compli-
cated	and	dangerous	for	several	reasons:
•	 The	 occurrence	 of	 “ammunition	
spreads”	 in	which	 different	 types	 of	
ammunition	are	mixed	and	scattered	
throughout	the	area	
•	 The	 presence	 of	 degraded	 flechette 
and	 fragmentation	 ammunition,	
which	consist	of	small	projectile	darts	
and	shrapnel	that	are	hazardous	and	
not	immediately	identifiable
•	 The	 presence	 of	 white	 phosphorus,	
which	ignites	when	exposed	to	air
•	 Incorrect	 or	 misleading	 marking	
of	UXO	
Taking	 into	 account	 that	 15	 years	 have	
passed	since	the	warehouse	explosion,	clear-
ance	of	this	ammunition	is	a	complicated—
yet	extremely	important—task.	
In	 addition	 to	 planned	 clearance	 proj-
ects	 such	 as	 these	 mentioned,	 ANAMA	
also	provides	rapid	response	to	mine/UXO-	
related	 emergencies.	 When	 one	 Agstafa	
scrap-metal	 workshop	 set	 up	 by	 locals	
exploded	 approximately	 200	 metres	 (219	
yards)	from	a	residential	area,	the	workshop	
itself	 was	 totally	 destroyed	 and,	 according	
to	 official	 information	 by	 local	 authorities,	
three	 people	 were	 killed	 and	 23	 injured.	
Additionally,	the	explosion	damaged	houses	
as	 far	 as	 three	kilometres	 (two	miles)	 from	
the	 workshop.	 Immediately	 following	 the	
explosion,	 ANAMA	 established	 a	 team	 of	
UXO	 operators	 to	 carry	 out	 emergency	
marking	 and	 clearance	 operations	 in	 the	
incident	 area.	 Operations	 lasted	 for	 one	
month	and	as	a	result,	170,000	square	me-
tres	 (42	 acres)	 of	 land	 were	 cleared	 and	
more	 than	 5,007	 items	 of	 UXO	 (among	
them	 1,261	 pieces	 containing	 white	 phos-
phorous)	 were	 removed	 from	 the	 area	
and	 destroyed.	 ANAMA	 has	 continued	
to	 react	 quickly	 to	 any	 mine-	 and	 UXO-	
related	emergencies.
Conclusion
As	 the	 Japanese	 might	 say,	 “Tada yori 
takai mono wa nai” (“We	have	to	pay	much	
more	for	something	we	got	free	of	charge”).	
It	is	important	to	figure	out	how	to	solve	the	
existing	 problem	 of	 UXO	 and	 abandoned	
ammunition	 and	 how	 to	 protect	 ourselves	
from	 ERW	 in	 the	 future.	 Human	 beings	
created	 the	 problem—dropping	 the	 bombs	
and	abandoning	the	ammunition	“for	free”	
on	Azerbaijan—and	now	they	must	correct	
it	 at	 great	 cost	 by	 cleaning	up	 the	 country	
and	making	it	safe	again.
See Endnotes, page 109
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F ollowing	a	conflict,	humanitarian	organisations	are	generally	the	first	to	enter	a	country	to	deliver	aid	and	start	to	rebuild	the	country’s	infrastructure.	Aid	workers	often	rely	on	a	4x4	
sport-utility	 vehicle	 to	 transport	 supplies	 and	people.	This	 type	 of	
carrier	is	viewed	as	a	big,	strong	vehicle	with	high	mobility,	but	it	of-
fers	little	protection	against	landmines	and	other	explosive	remnants	
of	war.	It	is	what	is	known	as	a	“soft	vehicle.”
The	 term	ERW	 is	 very	 wide	 and	 covers	 anything	 from	 handgun	
ammunition	to	aircraft	bombs.1	The	majority	of	injuries,	however,	are	
caused	by	devices	like	anti-personnel	landmines,	anti-tank	mines	and,	as	
seen	recently	in	Lebanon,	air-dropped	submunition	“bomblets.”	Apart	
from	being	the	most	numerous,	AP	mines	are	directed	against	people	
on	foot	and	are	normally	designed	to	explode	following	a	relatively	small	
impact—often	by	the	pressure	of	a	foot	or	the	tripping	of	a	wire.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 small-	 or	 large-calibre	 gun	 ammunition,	 air-
craft	 bombs	 and	mortar	 rounds	 tend	 to	be	more	 stable—although	
when	they	do	explode,	the	results	can	be	much	more	devastating.	
The author discusses the challenges of protecting aid workers riding in 
traditional unarmoured vehicles from the dangers of explosive remnants of 
war. He offers some practical, after-market solutions that provide a high level 
of protection for much less than the cost of traditional armoured vehicles.
Protection of Soft Vehicles 
Against ERW
by	Thomas	Hvidtfeldt	[	Scanfiber	Composites	A/S	]
The	 extent	 to	 which	 AP	mines	 endanger	 passengers	 in	 a	 soft-
skinned	 SUV	 depends	 heavily	 upon	 which	 type	 of	 device	 we’re	
talking	about.	We	can	separate	the	various	devices	into	two	groups	
depending	on	their	primary	kill	mechanism:
•	 Blast ammunition	works	by	 creating	 a	powerful	blast	wave	
that	destroys	objects	in	close	proximity	to	the	explosion.
•	 Fragmenting ammunition	works	by	creating	a	cloud	of	high-
velocity	steel	fragments	intended	to	inflict	as	much	damage	as	
possible	to	anything	or	anyone	in	the	surrounding	area.
Most	AP	mines	 inflict	 injury	primarily	 through	 the	blast	effect	
and	normally	detonate	by	pressure.	The	effect	 from	the	blast	wave	
decreases	rapidly	with	distance	and	it	 is	often	a	“one	kill”	weapon.	
On	the	other	hand,	some	AP	mines	and	many	types	of	air-dropped	
bomblets	work	with	 fragmentation	as	 the	primary	kill	mechanism.	
The	same	goes	for	almost	all	mortar	rounds	and	artillery	ammuni-
tion.	Contrary	to	a	blast	wave,	which	loses	its	power	very	quickly,	
the	 high-density	 fragments	 surrounding	 the	 explosives	 maintain	
Effect	from	fragmenting	mine	on	a	vehicle.	Here	a	car’s	steel-plate	body	was	ruptured	by	fragments	
from	a	small	hand	grenade.	
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Side	Protection	and	Seat	Protection	is	one	product	that	offers	protection	from	roadside	bombs.
Death Valley Challenge to Raise $100K 
Mines Advisory Group, in partnership with CEIA USA, will sponsor a 423-kilometre (263-mile) 
bike trek across Death Valley, USA. Event organizers hope to raise nearly £40,000 (US$74,000) 
to support mine-action efforts around the globe. 
From 4–11 March 2007, 40 participants will travel and cycle to raise money and awareness. The 
registration fee for the event is only £175 ($325), but each participant is asked to raise 
£2,750 ($5,100) in sponsorships, half of which will cover the cost of running the event. 
Included in trek costs are London-to-Las Vegas airfare, accommodations, nearly all meals, 
the use of bicycles and other sundry expenses.
For more information on this trip, visit www.magclearsmines.org.
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